International development agencies invest heavily in institution building in fragile states, including expensive interventions to support democratic elections. Yet little evidence exists on whether elections enhance the domestic legitimacy of governments. Using the random assignment of an innovative election fraud-reducing intervention in Afghanistan, we find that decreasing electoral misconduct improves multiple survey measures of attitudes toward government, including: (1) whether Afghanistan is a democracy; (2) whether the police should resolve disputes; (3) whether members of parliament provide services; and (4) willingness to report insurgent behavior to security forces.
Introduction
Can fair elections enhance the legitimacy of governments in fragile states?
International development agencies invest heavily in building democratic institutions in states engaged in or emerging from conflict, often supporting expensive and even dangerous electoral processes (Bjornlund 2004 ). In part, such efforts rest on the assumption that democratic elections enhance the domestic legitimacy of governments by increasing citizens' willingness to be governed. This willingness may derive from an individual's perception of procedural legitimacy, where people consider a government more legitimate when it follows procedures that the population considers fair (Levi, Sacks and Tyler 2009; Tyler 1990 Tyler , 2006 Paternoster, Brame, Bachman, and Sherman 1997; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler and Huo 2002) , and/or outcome legitimacy, where people view a government as more legitimate if it competently produces public goods (Bernstein and Lü 2003; Fjeldstad and Semboja 2000; Guyer 1992; O'Brien 2002; Levi 2006) . Greater legitimacy, in turn, makes governing easier and carries with it the increased likelihood of a stable polity, holding important implications for domestic and global security.
In this paper we explore the role of election fairness in building government legitimacy by combining data from a randomized controlled trial designed to improve electoral quality in Afghanistan's 2010 Wolesi Jirga elections with data from a post-election survey of citizens affected by the 3 intervention. We find that respondents in areas that held fairer elections due to our treatment were more likely to consider their government legitimate as measured by proxies of perceived procedural fairness and performance, including (1) whether Afghanistan is a democracy; (2) whether the police should resolve disputes (3) whether members of parliament provide services; and (4) the willingness to report insurgent behavior to security forces. Moreover, these effects are strongest within the subsample of respondents who were not aware of the fairness-enhancing treatment, leading us to conclude that legitimacy was increased by perceptions of electoral fairness and efficacy. The fairness intervention seems to affect attitudes by decreasing visible signs of electoral fraud at respondents' local polling stations.
We believe that these findings linking electoral fairness to perceptions of government legitimacy are particularly compelling given the setting: an election in a country fraught with vote-rigging with what is by all accounts one of the most corrupt and dysfunctional governments in the world. Our study also challenges the view that Afghan politics is solely predetermined by pre-existing allegiances along ethnic, class, religious, or ideological lines. These results indicate that democratic reforms could have real political effects, even in a country with such strong extant loyalties.
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Theoretical approaches
A central problem of political inquiry for millennia has involved the legitimacy of the state (Alagappa 1995; Beetham 1991) . The causes and consequences of legitimate government are central issues of political economy and were a focus of enlightenment era political philosophy, which was concerned with nascent democracies.
1 In this paper, we seek to build on more recent efforts to examine the empirical aspects of political legitimacy; specifically, we focus on its relationship to democratic elections.
Definitions of legitimacy vary. For our purposes we adopt a minimalist stance, considering legitimacy to be an attribute of political authority that captures residents' acceptance that state institutions have "the right to issue certain commands, and that they, in turn, have an obligation or duty to comply" (Lake, 2010) . This definition, which appears in the context of the state-building literature, is especially appropriate for Afghanistan, where state institutions are weak, and multiple actors compete for political authority (Lyall, Blair and Imai, 2013) . When this acceptance translates into actual compliance with an authority's rules, it constitutes "behavioral" legitimacy (Hurd 1999; Kelman and Hamilton 1989; Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009; Tyler 2006 (Rothstein 2009 , Seligson 2002 . Authorities can maintain legitimacy even when individuals perceive an outcome to be unfair, as long as they consider the procedure generating it to be fair. Tyler (2006) , for example, finds a strong empirical relationship between individuals' evaluations of procedural justice and legitimacy in both public and private sector settings.
Individuals may also confer more or less legitimacy on an authority based on their assessment of competence, often measured by outcomes such as public service delivery and overall economic and political performance (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005; Gilley 2009; Levi 1988 Levi , 1997 Levi, Sacks and Tyler 2009; Rothstein 2005; Sarsfield and Echegaray 2006; van De Walle and Scott 2009 (Berman 2009; Brinkerhoff et al. 2009; OECD 2010; Vaux and Visman 2005) .
Policymakers and scholars consider the selection of leaders through fair elections to be a key part of establishing a legitimate state (Brancati and Snyder 2011; Diamond 2006; Goodwin-Gill 2006; Lindberg 2003; Ottoway 2003; Paris 2004; Rothstein 2009 ). Proponents of early elections argue that establishing elected authorities allows for a more peaceful way for parties to compete for office, thus increasing the possibility that a country will consolidate as a democracy (Diamond 2006) . Even if poorly run or beset with violence, elections may allow leaders and voters to begin the practice of democratic choice and ultimately lead to better future elections (Berman 2007; Carothers 2007; Lindberg 2003) . The promise of elections may also induce the international community to commit peacekeeping forces and development assistance necessary to help legitimize a fragile post conflict government (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008a; Lyons 2002). 7 Despite the important role that elections may serve in establishing legitimacy, the evidence is mixed. Recent research identifies many problems associated with holding elections in post-conflict environments. Brancati and Snyder (2009) find that calling for an election too soon is associated with an increased likelihood of renewed fighting. A quick election may increase the probability that one side or the other will ignore a loss at the ballot box and return to war, or may result in an elected government which pursues policies that impede further reform and instead rekindle conflict (Brancati and Snyder 2011; de Zeeuw 2008; Mansfield and Snyder 2007; Paris 2004) . Further, early elections are often fraudulent for a number of reasons, including the interests of those staging the elections, a lack of trustworthy electoral institutions, and the disorganization of the opposition (Bjornlund 2004; Hyde 2011; Kelley 2011) . Elections in societies divided along racial, ethnic, or other social lines are also more likely to produce immoderate campaigns, violence, and breakdown (Snyder 2000; Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972) . Indeed, Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2008) find no evidence that elections in post conflict environments reduce the risk of further war, and instead should be "promoted as intrinsically desirable rather than as mechanisms for increasing the durability of the post-conflict peace" (471).
We seek to contribute to prior studies by exploring whether the fairness of elections enhances legitimacy of government in a conflict setting. (Callen and Weidmann, 2013) . 
Research design and data
The results in this paper use data from a randomized evaluation of an original anti-fraud monitoring package that we conducted during Afghanistan's 2010
Wolesi Jirga election (Callen and Long, 2013) , and which we recount here. In this section we revisit that anti-fraud monitoring experiment as a prelude to our investigation of the effect of that fraud reduction on measures of legitimacy.
On election day and the day after, a team of Afghan researchers traveled to an experimental sample of 471 polling centers. 
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To measure the fairness of the election, researchers also investigated whether election materials were stolen or damaged the day after the election. Our staff were careful to investigate irregularities by interviewing local community 5 Of 471 polling centers, six did not open on election day. We drop these from our analysis. 6 Results below are robust to redefining treatment as both receiving and signing a letter.
14 members while not engaging IEC staff, so as not to create an additional treatment.
We received reports of candidate agents stealing or damaging materials at 62 (13 percent) of the 465 operating polling centers, a clear violation of the law. We define Election Returns Form Removed as an indicator equal to one if materials were reported stolen or damaged by a candidate agent at a given polling center.
We have several reasons to think that stealing or damaging tallies reflects an intention to manipulate the ballot aggregation process. Many of the Electoral
Complaints Commission (ECC) complaints reported in Callen and Long (2013) speculated that the purpose of stealing materials was to take them to a separate location, alter them, and then reinsert them into the counting process.
Alternatively, candidates might seek to destroy all evidence of the polling center count, and then manufacture an entirely new returns form at the Provincial Aggregation Center. [ Table 1 about here]
The Post-Election Survey
To measure the effect of election fairness on legitimacy, the focus of this paper, we combine the results of the letter intervention with data from a post-election survey which we conducted in December 2010, roughly three months after the Important to Report IED to ANSF is an indicator equal to one for individuals responding "Very Important" or "Somewhat Important" to this question. The question is intended to measure whether or not citizens view the ANSF as a competent provider of security, an important service to a highly vulnerable and war-torn population.
[ Table 2 about here] Table 2 reports summary statistics for these variables from the postelection survey. The data depict a country with uneven support for government.
About 68 percent of respondents view Afghanistan as a democracy, while only 18 percent prefer the police as their primary means of dispute adjudication. 20 percent of respondents believe that the Member of Parliament is responsible for providing services, while 94 percent respond that reporting an impending attack to the ANSF is important.
In Table 2 we also find a high incidence of electoral malpractice at the polling stations linked to survey respondents. At 13.4 percent of polling stations our staff recorded a report of candidate agents removing tallies (Form Removed).
A similar picture emerges from the baseline interviews, collected in August 2010, 20 which we return to below. 9 Our data also include two important descriptors of the environment that the elections were held in: the number of local military events tracked as by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (from their Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) database), with a mean of 2.6; and whether or not the polling station was visited by an international monitor on election day, which occurred in 16.5 percent of the sample (from Democracy International).
[ Table 3 about here] Table 3 reports summary statistics and verifies balanced randomization of our anti-fraud intervention between treatment and control polling stations, using our baseline survey of August 2010. Treatment status is balanced across baseline measures for all four key outcomes used in the study, which we expect given randomization. 10 We find no evidence of imbalance on other measures that might 9 Similar to the endline survey, we sampled respondents for the baseline, enumerators were told to begin at the polling center and survey either 6 or 8 subjects. Surveys were conducted in individuals' homes. Enumerators adhered to the right hand rule random selection method and respondents within houses were selected according to a Kish grid (Kish, 1949) .
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be relevant to attitudes, including military events in the vicinity and visits by international monitors.
Estimation Strategy and Results
Assignment to treatment is random. So the following equation consistently
estimates the effect of delivering the letter (which alerts the polling station manager of monitoring) on our measures of legitimacy:
All specifications reflect our assignment strategy, by including stratum dummies as suggested by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009).
[ Table 4 about here] Turning to columns (4) -(6), using the police to solve disputes indicates a preference for using formal procedures rather than informal institutions --abundantly available in Afghanistan--for dispute resolution. Treatment causally increases reported willingness to use police by 2.3 percentage points in the uncontrolled specification and by 3.6 percentage points with a full set of controls (column 6). 12 The latter result is statistically significant at the five percent level and provides supportive evidence for Hypothesis 1.
In Panel B, columns (1)- (3), we find that the fraud reduction intervention causally increased beliefs that members of parliament are responsible for providing services by 4.1 percentage points, compared to a base of 17.8 percent in the control group, supporting Hypothesis 2. This result is statistically significant and robust to the addition of a broad set of controls, as reported in columns (2) 11 For ease of exposition, we restrict our sample to respondents who provide some response to the four questions corresponding to our main outcome and to our question regarding whether they were aware that the monitoring exercise was conducted by outsiders. All specification in Tables 4  and 5 therefore have either 2313 (specifications including polling centers without pre-election survey data) or 2200 (specifications including only polling centers with pre-election data) observations. Results (unreported) are nearly identical removing this restriction, though sample sizes vary between specifications according to the number of respondents providing some response to the question used as the dependent variable. 12 The difference in point estimates is partly due to the difference in samples. Moving from column (4) to column (5), the sample is reduced by 18 polling centers and 113 respondents. These 18 polling centers are part of the sample of 21 polling centers in Kabul that we added to the experiment after the completion of the baseline survey.
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and (3) (as expected with random assignment to treatment). Still in Panel B, columns (4)-(6) report effects on citizens' attitude that it is important to cooperate with security forces by reporting IEDs. Treatment increases reported willingness to report by 2.5 percentage points (column (4)) in the specification without controls, and by 3 percentage points in the specification with a full set of controls.
Both results are statistically significant, and again support Hypothesis 2, that electoral fairness enhances outcome legitimacy.
In summary, the electoral fraud reduction treatment increased perceptions of legitimacy of the Afghan government for four measures of procedural and outcome legitimacy. Those effects were statistically significant for three of the four measures. Figure 4 summarizes those results graphically, reporting treatment effects and 95% confidence intervals for the four measures.
[ Figure 4 about here]
Turning to other measures of legitimacy collected in our survey, we find additional evidence that electoral fraud reduction improved perceptions of legitimacy. Our survey includes seven additional measures related to attitudes toward government and willingness to be governed. For instance, we also included a question about another important concept found in discussions of government legitimacy regarding taxation. Respondents were asked to rank the importance of paying taxes as "not at all important," somewhat important," or 24 "very important." 13 14 Table 5 reports the results of estimating treatment effects for these measures. Five of the seven additional measures yield estimated treatment effects in the direction predicted by theories of procedural fairness and public service provision. Of these, two are statistically significant at the 99 percent level, both of which are related to taxes.
15 Table 5 also reports treatment effects aggregated across outcome measures. Following Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007) and Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel (2013), we estimate standardized treatment effects, standardizing outcomes by subtracting their mean and dividing by their standard deviation so that all outcomes are measured in standard deviation units. We then create an index which is simply the arithmetic average of these standardized outcomes. We calculate separate indexes for: (i) the four dependent variables used in our main analysis; (ii) the seven additional outcomes reflecting alternative measures of legitimacy related to either conditional consent or service provision; and (iii) all 13 For the full text for these questions and a description of how they are coded to create outcome measures see the Appendix. 14 We also estimated treatment effects on dummy variables set equal to one when respondents indicate supporting the Central Government, Provincial Government, or local Community Development Council as the unit that should provide services. Consistent with our main results, we find a significant and negative treatment effect for the provincial government, which is appointed rather than elected. However, this may be due just to a simple adding up constraintsince the choices are exclusive--so we do not report it. 15 We report estimates using as dependent variables dummy variables equal to one for respondents indicating that (i) paying taxes is very important,; (ii) paying taxes is somewhat important; and (iii) paying taxes is somewhat or very important. The third is the sum of the first two. We report estimates for all three in order to indicate the insignificant but negative estimate corresponding to (i). If we remove (iii) from the additional variable index and all variable index the estimates are nearly identical and remain statistically significant at the 99 percent level.
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11 variables. Estimated treatment effects on these indices are all statistically significant at the 95 percent level, even after adjusting p-values to reflect multiple hypothesis testing using the method of Young and Westfall (1993) .
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[ Table 5 about here]
The estimated treatment effect of 0.10 standard deviations for the four primary outcome variables is comparable in size to the estimated effect using the index calculated using the remaining seven measures as an outcome (0.06 standard deviations). In summary, estimated treatment effects using the additional seven measures and indices based on all measures yield results that strongly reinforce the conclusion of Table 4 : treatment improved attitudes toward government and increased willingness to be governed.
Does Enhanced Fairness Increase Legitimacy if Perceived as External?
Hypotheses 3 and 4 state that an individual will not credit government with improved legitimacy (procedural or outcome based) if they observe that enhancements in election fairness were caused by a non-governmental (i.e., external) intervention. Our survey asked respondents if they had knowledge of the 26 researcher team or their actions in providing the letter treatment. About 11 percent responded that they were aware. Table 6 repeats the analysis of Table 4 , estimating the same equation with an added indicator variable Aware of Delivery, which takes the value one if the respondent is in the treated sample and responded that they had knowledge about the treatment. These estimates are not experimental, since awareness was not randomly assigned within the treatment group; nor is there any means to identify the comparison group in the control sample who would have been aware of treatment had they been treated.
[ Table 6 about here]
The estimated coefficient of Aware of Delivery represents the contrast between the predicted value of the outcome variable for the unaware treated and that of the aware treated. That estimate is subject to possible selection bias, since those aware of treatment might have a priori different outcomes. That would be true, for instance, if the aware were keen observers of local politics and were therefore more cynical about Afghan democracy.
Being aware of letter delivery undermines the treatment effect for two of the four outcome measures. Specifically, for the outcomes Afghanistan is a Democracy and Police Should Resolve Disputes, including the awareness indicator increases the size of the positive estimated treatment effect, which is now estimated solely using the (distorted) aware sample, while generating an 27 estimated negative effect for the aware sample of at least the same size (columns 1 and 4). While these estimates are not experimental, they do retain their size when stratum fixed effects and additional covariates are added (columns 3 and 6).
For the other two variables awareness predicts a statistical zero, so that the treatment effect is statistically the same for both aware and unaware samples. In sum, treatment has no effect on outcomes for two of our four variables for respondents aware that an external actor was responsible for delivering the notification letter. We interpret this as mixed but weakly supportive evidence for Hypotheses 3 and 4.
All told, we find strong experimental evidence that the fraud-reduction intervention improves perceptions of procedural and outcome legitimacy. We also find weakly supportive evidence for the implied hypothesis that citizens must perceive a relatively clean election to be the consequence of the actions of a domestic government, as opposed to the result of an outside intervention, for legitimacy to be enhanced. Taken together, these results indicate that even in a nascent democracy with weak institutions such as Afghanistan, improving procedural and outcome legitimacy has consequential effects on attitudes towards government.
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Conclusions
We have reported experimental evidence showing that the fairness of elections affects attitudes of citizens towards their government directly relevant to their willingness to be governed, a contributor to legitimacy. Experimental evidence of this nature is new to the literature and is particularly compelling given the setting:
even in the context of an ongoing insurgency and with an infamously ineffective government rife with corruption, we find that enhancing electoral fairness seems to contribute to state legitimacy in Afghanistan.
These findings speak both to policy and to the study of legitimacy in nascent democracies. From a policy perspective, our results reinforce the notion that domestic legitimacy, and therefore stability, can be enhanced by interventions that improve the fairness of elections, an assumption that undergirds the current emphasis the international community places on holding elections in fragile states and the considerable investments it makes to ensure electoral integrity.
Importantly, our results are mute on the effectiveness of election monitoring-the most common intervention-as an integrity-enhancing technique. Indeed, we find in passing some evidence suggesting that the design of election monitoring in that The level of analysis corresponds to the level at which we observe the dependent variable. Columns (1), (2), and (3) report OLS specifications estimated at the polling center level. Columns (4) - (9) are estimated at the candidate -polling station level. Correspondingly, robust (White) standard errors are reported in parentheses for columns (1) -(3) (not clustered since data are already aggregated to the polling center level) and robust standard errors are clustered at the polling center level in columns (4) -(9). Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The "additional covariates" are the number of military events within 1KM of the polling center, whether the polling center was visited by international monitors, and the average response within the polling center catchment from our baseline survey fielded in August 2010 to whether the respondent is employed, years of education, general happiness (1-10), gender, marital status, and age. For descriptive statistics see Table 1 of Callen and Long, 2010. Notes: Significance levels (naive p-value) indicated by *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01. Robust standard errors clustered at polling center level reported in parentheses. Treatment effects are standardized regression coefficients from a regression of the dependent variable, normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation, on an indicator for treatment and stratum fixed effects. The Four Primary Outcomes Index is the average of four normalized variables in rows 2 through 5. The Additional Variable Index is the average of the seven normalized variables in rows 7 through 13. All Variables Index is based on all 11 outcome measures. Family-wise error rate (FWER) adjusted p-values limit the probability of any Type I errors when considering all 11 hypotheses as a group, and are calculated using the Westfall and Young (1993) free step-down re-sampling method as detailed in Anderson (2008) . All regressions use data from 2200 respondents (in 437 polling centers) except: 
